Globalization of scientific and technological knowledge has reduced the US share of world scientific activity, increased the foreign-born proportion of scientists and engineers in US universities and in the US labor market, and led to greater US scientific collaborations with other countries. China's massive investments in university education and research and development (R&D) have, in particular, made it a special partner for the United States in scientific work. These developments have substantial implications for US science and technology policy. This paper suggests that aligning immigration policies more closely to the influx of international students, granting fellowships to students working on turning scientific and technological advances into commercial innovations, and requiring firms with R&D tax credits or other government R&D funding develop "impact plans" to use their new knowledge to produce innovative products or processes in the United States could help the country adjust to the changing global world of science and technology.
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Freeman S&T policies more important in determining economic outcomes than in earlier post-World War II decades when the United States naturally dominated the production and application of knowledge to the economy.
This paper analyzes the globalization of science and engineering and knowledge production in the twenty-first century and its implications for US science and technology policies.
Section I documents the spread of advanced knowledge and knowledge creation around the world in terms of its impact on the US share of the world's science and engineering activity. It stresses that the rapid catch-up in knowledge-creating activities and production in low-wage developing countries, most notably China, constitutes a major challenge for the United States. The catch-up undermines the "NorthSouth" model of trade that posited that advanced countries inevitably have comparative advantage in the production of high value-added innovations. 2 Section II shows that the catch-up has "globalized" science and engineering within the United States by increasing the foreign-born share of science and engineering graduate students and postdocs in US universities and the foreign-born share of the US's science and engineering workforce, and by spurring international collaborations in knowledge production and innovation, thereby speeding knowledge creation and the spread of new knowledge worldwide.
Section III examines possible changes in US policies regarding international students, postdoctoral workers and science and engineering (S&E) immigrants, and regarding the link between technology-based innovations and production. It argues that globalization of knowledge makes S&T policies the "industrial policy" of the twenty-first century, with implications for economic performance broadly. To maximize the benefits of the globalization of knowledge requires the United States to balance investments that expand the stock of global knowledge and policies that localize a share of the gains in the domestic economy.
I. Globalization of S&E Activity across Countries
Not so long ago the United States was the colossus in producing new science and technology and developing science and technology-based innovations. In 1970, with just 5-6% of the world's population, the United States had 29% of university enrollments, over half of science and engineering PhDs, performed 40% of world R&D, wrote 32% of all scientific Immigration, International Collaboration, and Innovation 155 papers, and 57% of the most highly cited papers. 3 The United States accounted for 28% of world gross domestic product (GDP) in 1970 and had a GDP per capita five times the global average. 4 Investments by the rest of the world in higher education and research in the past half century or so have reduced US predominance in science and engineering. Advanced European countries recovering from World War II increased university enrollments and R&D expenditures from the 1960s to the present. Japan and later the Asian Tiger economies did the same. Beginning in the 1990s developing countries substantially expanded their higher educational systems and scientific activity. Despite its low level of GDP per capita, China graduated huge numbers of scientists and engineers and poured sufficient money into R&D from the beginning of the twenty-first century to 2013 to become a superpower in science and engineering, which will inevitably translate into innovation in high-tech and other sectors.
The rapidity with which China and other developing economies have moved toward the frontier in knowledge creation and in the application of advanced knowledge to the economy is arguably the great surprise of modern globalization. When Americans debated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) treaty two decades ago, analysts had no notion that in the near future low-wage countries would increase their supplies of university-educated workers and invest enough in R&D to challenge the United States in knowledge and technologyintensive sectors. Proponents of free trade promised American workers that the solution to low wage competition from Mexico was university education. Opponents warned of the "giant sucking sound" of factory assembly jobs moving to Mexico to hire low-wage workers.
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Post-NAFTA the proportion of young Americans in colleges and universities increased, driven by an influx of women. But continuing a trend that began as early as the 1970s, the proportion of young persons in tertiary education in other countries increased more rapidly than in the United States. From 1970 to 2010 the US share of the world's university students fell from 29% to 11%. In the 1970s and 1980s the spread of mass higher education in Europe was the major factor in the decline of the US share of world college enrollments.
6 By 2010 enough advanced countries had expanded their higher educational systems to drop the United States from a top position to middle of the pack in the ranking of countries by the proportion of young persons in university. 7 In the 1990s and early in the twenty-first century, the downward trend in the US share of world university students was largely driven by the expansion of higher education in China, India, and other developing countries. In 1970 China had just 47,000 undergraduate students and essentially no graduate students (courtesy of the cultural revolution destruction of higher education). In 1980 China had 1.3 million undergraduates enrolled and 21,000 graduate students. In 1990, it had 2.1 million undergraduates and 93,000 graduate students. In 2000, 5.6 million undergraduates and 301,000 graduate students (Li 2010, tables 8.1 and 8.2) . By 2010, China had increased enrollments to 30 million students and graduated six million persons with bachelor's degrees. The other hugely populous country, India, expanded its higher educational system more slowly but still enrolled 21 million students in 2010. From 2008 to 2012 India more than doubled the number of Indian Institutes for Technology.
8 According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2013) , in the first decade of the twenty-first century Mexico, the focus of the NAFTA debate, had the highest average annual rate of growth of first-time upper secondary graduation rates among OECD countries. Mexico increased its tertiary graduation by 6 percentage points between 2000 and 2011. Because the proportion of bachelor's degrees going to science and engineering in most countries exceeds the proportion in the United States, increased enrollments and graduates overseas have an amplified effect in reducing the US share of BS scientists and engineers. Table 1 measures the globalization of scientific and engineering activity in terms of its impact on the US share of world research and S&E activity, as given from data in the National Science Board's Science and Engineering Indicators and the OECD's Main Science and Technology Indicators Database. The data for the first decade of the twenty-first century are based on comparable statistics that cover nearly identical samples of countries. The "world" data in earlier years are sparser and reported differently, giving cruder measure of the trends, with, for example, OECD measures of country R&D differing modestly from the Science and Indicators measures for some countries, and so forth.
9 To deal with this problem, I report modestly different statistics under some headings. The trend changes are sufficiently large to make it clear that global catch-up produced a huge drop in the relative position of the United States, however measured.
First, the US share of R&D spending and of researchers dropped sharply in the first decade of the twenty-first century, as China expanded its scientific activities extraordinarily rapidly (lines 1 and 2). By 2011 China was the second biggest performer of R&D, accounting for 18% of R&D among the countries covered while Japan accounted for 11%. The largest European Union (EU) performer, Germany, spent 8% of global R&D but the EU in its entirety accounted for 28% (NSB 2014, table 4-13) . With Asian countries beside China, Japan, and South Korea increasing R&D substantially and with Brazil increasing its R&D, the concentration of R&D in the United States and other advanced countries declined. The OECD series on the number of researchers follows a similar pattern, albeit subject to problems in consistency of statistics , 1982 , 1987 , 2002 . 4. Science and Engineering Indicators, 2014 , appendix table 5-57, earlier years from Science and Engineering Indicators, 1982 , 1987 , 2002 . 5. Science and Engineering Indicators, 2014 . Earlier years from Science and Engineering Indicators, 1982 , 1987 , 2002 . 6. Science and Engineering Indicators, 2014 . Earlier years from Science and Engineering Indicators, 1982 , 1987 , 2002 . *"World" limited to European Union, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and China.
for some countries, notably China. By 2012 the OECD data show that China surpassed the United States in the number of full-time equivalent research personnel. Lines 3 and 4 turn to the US share of scientific and engineering publications and citations. The US share of global scientific papers held roughly steady from 1970 through 1990 then fell to 31% in 2000 and to 26% in 2011. 10 The decline in the 1990s resulted largely from expanded activity in other advanced countries whereas the decline in the first decade of the twenty-first century resulted largely from the huge increase in papers with addresses in China. The increased China share of papers exceeds the absolute value of the decline in the US share and was associated with smaller EU and Japan shares of world papers as well.
From the 1970s through 2000, the Indicators report the US share of citations. Thereafter it reports the US share of articles in the upper 1% of the distribution of papers ordered by their citations. The US share of citations dropped commensurately with the drop in the share of papers from 1990 to 2000. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the share of highly cited papers declines more in absolute and proportionate terms than the US share of all papers, as the rest of the world reduced the citation gap. China's increased share of top 1% cited papers falls short of the drop in the US share. But even though the US share of most highly cited papers fell, the United States still maintained a remarkably high share given the decline in the US share of papers.
Turning to higher education, the table shows that the US share of bachelor's science and engineering graduates and doctorate S&E degrees fell from the 1970s through the first decade of the twenty-first century. The EU countries expanded doctorate science and engineering programs so rapidly that by 2010 the EU produced nearly twice as many natural sciences and engineering PhDs as the United States-a differential that reflects in part the shorter time period for gaining a doctorate in those countries than in the United States. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, the big mover in the production of doctorate degrees was China, which increased its S&E PhD graduates so rapidly that by 2007 the number of students obtaining natural science and engineering PhDs in China exceeded the number obtaining those degrees in the United States.
11 While the quality of China's graduate training falls short of that in the United States, its jump from negligible producer of S&E PhDs to top single country is remarkable. Recognizing its lag in the quality of doctorate education, moreover, China encour-ages top students to enroll in doctorate programs in the United States and other advanced countries. It funds PhD students and researchers to spend a year overseas to improve their research skills. China will almost certainly improve its position in the knowledge-intensive and high-technology sectors of the economy on which the United States relies for economic growth and comparative advantage in trade.
In 1990 virtually no major multinational undertook substantial R&D in a developing country such as China. American-based firms concentrated their R&D in the United States with some investments in other advanced countries. In 2000, multinational firms had on the order of 120 R&D centers in China. In 2013, multinational firms had over 1,300 R&D centers in China. Sixty-one percent of R&D performing multinationals reported at least one research and development center in China (KPMG 2013) . In 2013, four of IBM's 12 major research facilities were in developing countries: China (established 1995), India (1998), Brazil (2010), and Kenya (2013) . 12 Companies locate R&D around the world in part to be near the markets of consumers of their products or to be close to the production plants of their firm or its major suppliers. But the key factor in the spread of multinational research facilities worldwide is the new availability of qualified scientific and engineering workers in developing countries at lower wages than in advanced countries.
The development of the global solar energy industry provides a striking example of the changing advantages of the United States and other advanced countries in a bulwark green technology. When the Obama administration loaned substantial government funds to US solar manufacturers as part of its sustainable energy policies and spent $9 billion in federal stimulus funds on green energy it did not appreciate the huge advances China had made in the sector, which reduced the prices of solar panels sufficiently to bankrupt several leading edge US firms. 13 In 2012, for example, the Massachusetts firm A123 battery, which had received millions of dollars of US government R&D support to develop innovative batteries, went bankrupt. In 2013 the Chinese automaker Wanxiang bought A123, only to sell the part of the firm that produced large batteries to store power from intermittent energy sources such as wind turbines to Japan's NEC corporation the following year.
14 For further evidence of the spread of multinational investments, Massachusetts-based Applied Materials built what it calls "the world's largest and most advanced" solar R&D facility in Xian "to take advantage of local research talent, manufacturing capabilities, and to near to its largest market" (Quan 2009; Bradisher 2010) while DuPont agreed to collaborate with China's GD Solar in materials research for the Chinese firms' PV panels and systems.
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In sum, the United States remains the lead country in R&D worldwide, but global catch-up has shrunk the US advantage and is likely to continue to do so into the foreseeable future. Whether or not China surpasses the United States in R&D spending in the next 10-15 years, as trend extrapolations suggest, the globalization of basic and applied science and of product development has created a new world of knowledge creation and application to the economic world.
II. S&E Globalization within the United States
Globalization affects science and engineering activity within countries as well as among countries. Within the United States globalization takes several forms: international students who study in the United States, postdoctoral students/workers from overseas in US laboratories, scientists and engineers who immigrate to the United States, and collaborations between US researchers and overseas colleagues.
A. International Students
International students are the fastest growing part of the global higher educational system. Between 1975 and 2010 the number of international students increased nearly sevenfold, producing a growth rate about three times as large as that for tertiary education students worldwide. As the lead scientific country and highly desirable location for educated workers, the United States is a major attractor of international students in science and engineering. In 2011, 21% of S&E students enrolled outside their country of origin were enrolled in US institutions of higher education (Ruiz 2013) . The top supplying countries for international students were China and India, with the Chinese more concentrated in the sciences and the Indians more concentrated in engineering. Many international students obtain work visas to remain in the United States for the early years of their scientific careers. Many become permanent residents. Table 2 shows the foreign-born proportions of US undergraduate and graduate enrollments, of bachelor's, master's, and PhD S&E degrees, and of postdoctoral students/workers. Although 33.2% of foreign-born undergraduates were enrolled in S&E in 2012, the foreign born make up just 4.4% of bachelor's degrees is science and engineering (NSB 2014, table 2-19, 65). The percent in engineering exceeds that in the natural or social sciences but is still in single digits (6.3%). International students are more highly represented at the graduate level, where they make up around one-third of S&E enrollments, one-quarter of master's degrees, one-third of PhDs, and over half of postdocs. The foreign-born share of PhDs is lower in the biological sciences (27.4%) than in physics (45.4%) or engineering (56.2%), and is lower in the social/behavioral sciences (19.7%) than in the natural sciences (31.4%). But the field with the highest proportion of doctorates going to foreign-born persons was economics (60.4%) (NSB 2014, appendix table 2-31). Among postdoctorates the foreign-born proportion is 60% in engineering compared to 30.3% in psychology (NSF 2013) . Without the foreign born, many US labs would close or shrink massively, at least in the short run.
The United States treats applicants for student visas (and other nonimmigrant visas) as potential immigrants who must declare to the consular officer that they do not intend to immigrate and have stronger reasons to return home than to move to the United States. 16 But this is a pro forma declaration, as many international students stay in the United States and work for years. Table 3 gives two measures of the tendency for foreign-born PhDs to work in the United States after graduation: the Survey of Doctorate Records (SDR) question on intention to work in the United States upon graduation, and five-year "stay rates"-the proportion of doctorates with temporary visas that Social Security records show worked in the United States five years after obtaining their doctorate degree. The SDR finds that about three-quarters of graduates intend to work in the United States as postdocs or at other jobs, which is consistent with the stay rates data that show that two-thirds of PhDs in a given year's graduating cohort work in the United States over the next five years. The stay rates are highest, though declining, for China and India and lower, but rising, in South Korea, Japan, Mexico, and Brazil. The consistency between the intentions of foreign-born doctorates to work in the United States and ensuing work behavior implies that responses to the question on intentions is a good indicator of future behavior. The attractiveness of the United States to foreign students and their tendency to work in the country thereafter enlarges the US S&E labor supply. To the extent that foreign-born graduates choose their country of work by comparing careers in their home country or other non-US locations to careers in the United States while US graduates focus primarily on US opportunities, the greater the foreign-born share of doctorates, the more sensitive is the supply of US graduates to market conditions. Table 4 moves from enrollments and degrees to employment in S&E occupations for persons differentiated by level of degree. The foreignborn make up a substantial and increasing share of working scientists and engineers, with smaller shares for persons at the bachelor's level than for master's and doctorate graduates. In 2011, 19% of bachelor's scientists and engineers were foreign born-a figure that far exceeds the foreign-born proportion of US S&E bachelor's graduates. Since the number of foreign-born workers consists of US-trained and non-UStrained foreign-born workers, the bachelor's proportion indicates sizable immigration of foreign-trained bachelor's degree scientists and engineers to the United States. 17 While the foreign-born shares of master's and PhD S&E workers are close to the foreign-born shares of S&E graduates with those degrees, substantial numbers of US-educated, foreign-born master's and doctorate graduates leave the United States, so that the final number of foreign-born scientists and engineers with PhDs and master's degrees also reflects immigration of persons trained overseas. Asked why they came to the United States, foreign-trained immigrants give job/economic opportunities (29%) as the most important factor, followed by family situations (23%), scientific or professional infrastructure (11%), and educational opportunities (10%).
B. Immigrant Scientists and Engineers

18
Since far more foreign-born university graduates obtain their highest degrees outside the United States than in the United States, one might expect that the number of foreign-trained, foreign-born scientists and engineers working in the United States would far exceed the number of US-trained, foreign-born scientists and engineers. The opposite is true. Table 5 shows that in 2005 the majority of foreign-born scientists and engineers in the country were US-trained. The National Science Foundation (NSF)'s SESTAT data file tells a similar story. Over half of foreign-born scientists and engineers working in the United States obtained their bachelor's degree in the United States. Two-thirds of those with a doctorate or master's degree completed their highest degree in the United States while, by contrast, only one-quarter of foreign-born scientists and engineers with an advanced degree received both their first and highest degree abroad, and thus came to the United States on immigrant visas rather than student visas (NSB 2014, 3-53 and 3-54) . Why are international students such a large source of immigrant scientists and engineers?
One likely reason is that students who come to the United States selfselect from persons especially attracted to the United States with a high penchant to immigrate given the opportunity. What makes the United States especially attractive to them? The single most popular reason the foreign born graduate from US institutions is, not surprisingly, educational opportunity (27%) (NSB 2014, 3-54) . Another factor likely to induce international students to immigrate to the United States is accrual of US-specific knowledge, from career to social connections.
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In sum, immigrant scientists and engineers to the United States come largely from international students, which makes the attractiveness of US higher education and policies toward student visas an intrinsic part of policies toward the immigration of scientists and engineers.
C. International Collaborations in Research Papers
Scientific research has moved from lone investigators to collaborative research, producing an upward trend in authors per paper (Jones, Wuchty, and Uzzi 2008; Wuchty, Jones, and Uzzi 2007; Hsu and Huang 2011; Adams et al. 2005) . Papers with larger numbers of authors are especially likely to be published in journals with high impact factors and garner relatively many citations (Lawani 1986; Katz and Hicks 1997;  These outcomes offer a potential productivity justification for increased collaborations. 20 In the past two decades the trend in coauthorship has extended across country lines, with a larger proportion of papers coauthored by scientists from different countries (NSB 2014; Adams 2013) . Table 6 examines the pattern and change in internationally coauthored papers and the position of the United States and its main collaborating partners in these collaborations. The columns "share of S&E articles internationally coauthored" records the ratio of articles with two or more international addresses relative to all articles for the specified group. The shares increase for the world, the United States, and other countries, though only modestly for China and South Korea, whose numbers of articles increased largely through within-country collaborations. Internationally coauthored articles are a smaller share of articles for the United States and Japan than for European countries and for Canada and Australia, presumably because the United States and Japan have much larger researcher populations, which creates a larger pool for intracountry collaborations. The table shows somewhat surprisingly a higher share of internationally coauthored papers for individual countries than for the world, in most cases by large amounts. The reason is that the Science Indicator tabulations count an interna- tional paper with coauthors from two countries as a single paper at the world level but as two international papers at the country level, with a count of one for each country.
The columns "US share of international collaborations" record the ratio of papers in which at least one author has a US address and at least one has an address in another country divided by the total number of international collaborations for the relevant entity. The United States is a huge contributor to international collaborations worldwide, with 43.8% of world collaborations in 1997 and 43% of world collaborations in 2012. That the United States maintained its share of world collaborations in a period when the US share of papers fell markedly is indicative of the US position as a hub of world science. In 2012, the countries with particularly large US shares of international collaborations were South Korea, Canada, and China. The surprise relative to earlier years is China, whose collaborative research with the United States increased greatly in the first decade of the twenty-first century so that the US share of China collaborations exceeds the US share of all international collaborations.
The columns "Country shares of US international collaborations" give the ratio of the number of papers in which an address for the given country appears along with a US address on the paper divided by all US international collaborations. The "country shares" are lower than the "US shares" because the number of papers by US-based scientists far exceeds the number of papers in the other countries. The most striking change in these columns is for China, which increased its share of US international collaborations fivefold to become the leading collaborator for US scientific papers.
The huge increase in China-US collaborations suggests that the two countries are developing a "special relationship" in science and engineering. Because many international students and postdoctoral students in the United States are Chinese, the tie between the US and Chinese researchers extends to collaborations within the United States. Freeman and Huang (2014a) find that late in the first decade of the twenty-first century 14% of the names on research papers with only US addresses were Chinese names, the vast majority whose first names or initial indicate that they were born outside the United States (Xu Wang rather than Andrew Wang). Within China, moreover, a substantial number of highly productive researchers have US-research experience, as indicated by their having written papers with only US addresses. The decision of the Chinese government to fund Chinese students and fac-ulty to spend up to one year studying and working in the United States and other advanced countries has fueled the growing link between the United States and China.
What is the impact of international collaborations on the quality of scientific papers and US science in particular?
It is well established that papers with international collaborators are published in higher-impact journals and obtain more citations than papers with solely domestic collaborators (Katz and Hicks 1997; Adams 2013) . One possible interpretation is that international collaborations add a special synergy to research, but international collaborations average more authors than single-country collaborations. Given that numbers of authors is associated with greater impact factors and citations, the international collaboration edge could simply reflect numbers of authors on those collaborations. Regressions of impact factors and citations on whether papers in nanoscience and nanotechnology, biotechnology and applied microbiology, and particle and field physics have international addresses show that introduction of numbers of authors changes the sign on the variable for international collaborations from positive to negative (Freeman, Ganguli, and Murciano-Goroff 2014) . In these fields, international collaborations look better because they are bigger than domestic collaborations.
At the same time, international collaborations between researchers from the United States, a top country in impact factors and citations, and researchers from countries lower in those outcomes are by the arithmetic of averages likely to produce lower impact factors and citations for international collaboration than for domestic collaborations for the United States and higher impact factors in the country with lower average outcomes than for its domestic collaborations. Who collaborates with whom should matter in the impact factors and citations associated with international collaborations. Examining impact factors and citations for US-China collaborations, Freeman and Huang (2014b) find such patterns with some twists that illuminate the special research relation between the two countries. On average, US-China collaborations have impact factors and citations that lie between the US's high impact and citation numbers and the relatively low but increasing impact factors and citations for China. The twists are: (1) that researchers in China with US research experience (defined as having an earlier paper solely with a US address) have higher impact factors and citations on their China-addressed papers than are found for other China-addressed papers, which suggests that the Chinese researchers increase their re-search skills working in the United States; and (2) that US-addressed papers with a Chinese first author gain higher impact factors and citations than other US-addressed papers, suggesting that US research gains from attracting some of China's best and brightest young postdocs and graduate students; and (3) that Chinese researchers with US experience have higher impact factors and citations when they work in the United States than when they work in China. A natural interpretation of the better outcomes for Chinese researchers when they are in the United States is the country's exceptional climate for scientific work. Today's world of global science and engineering diverges greatly from the World War II/Cold War period when the United States developed its science and technology policy. 22 The spread of knowledge discovery and of knowledge throughout the world has reduced the US edge in high-tech and knowledge-intensive activities. Developing countries have the human resources to produce scientific and technical breakthroughs and the manufacturing capability to produce innovative goods and services that economists once viewed as soley in the province of advanced countries. The US's S&E workforce increasingly consists of immigrant scientists and engineers, many of whom come to the country as international students. Students, immigrant researchers, and collaborations with Chinese researchers have become critical in US scientific activity.
The United States has considerable assets in the global knowledge economy: the world's preeminent higher education system, 23 which draws the best and brightest students from around the world; a large exemplary research enterprise that is the hub of global research and international collaborations; a successful innovation system protected by intellectual property rights; and a business culture that encourages start-ups to translate research findings into goods and services. The danger to the United States is that other countries, particularly those with lower wages and labor costs, will produce an increasing proportion of the science and engineering-based innovations and reduce the US's comparative advantage in science-based discovery and its application to the economy, adding a trade x technology twist to the economic problems facing many US workers. What types of policies might help the country benefit from the new globalization of knowledge and avoid the dangers?
A. More Economics in Assessing the Country's Research Portfolio
In a world where economic growth and comparative advantage depend critically on science and technology, it seems sensible for S&T policy to focus more on the potential impacts of science and engineering on the future state of the economy than in earlier times when the primary goal of S&T policy was to give expert input to decision makers on complex scientific and technical issues. Policies toward R&D are an important tool for encouraging economic activity in some areas rather than in others-a new industrial policy, as it were. If the government puts more money into the basic research that underpins a given industry, supports its R&D with R&D tax credits, purchases its advanced products, or enacts regulations favoring those products, that industry is likely to prosper compared to competitor industries. The country's research portfolio and policies will thus influence the future composition of output and employment.
Since the 1990s doubling of the NIH budget, if not earlier, the US research portfolio has been more heavily invested in biological and medical sciences than the research portfolios of other major countries. In 2011, 51.6% of US research moneys went to the biomedical fields compared to 43.3% of EU research moneys, 42% of Japan's research moneys, and 26% of China's spending (NSB 2014, table 5-21) . The concentration on biomedical sciences reflects the Clinton administration's policy in the late 1990s of doubling the NIH budget, Senator Arlen Specter's support of the doubling in budget deliberations, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act stimulus funding for the NIH due to Senator Specter's favoring biomedical sciences. These expenditures affected the educational and career decisions of science students, the direction of scientific research, and the types of immigrant scientists and postdoctoral students that have come to the country. Science and technology policy should bring more economics to bear in assessing the research portfolio and helping guide decisions by policymakers.
B. Resources for Moving R&D Outcomes to Production in the United States
The biggest problem that the globalization of knowledge and knowledge-creation presents to the United States is that innovative goods and services developed by US research expenditures will increasingly be produced in lower-wage countries, adversely affecting many US workers. What policies might enhance the ability of the United States to hold its own in this terrain? The high responsiveness evinced by students to fellowships offers a possible way to affect education and career decisions in ways that would strengthen the link from scientific progress to production. When the NSF nearly doubled the value of graduate student fellowships in the late 1990s and early in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the number and quality of applicants rose sharply and seemed to raise graduate students' enrollments broadly (Freeman, Chang, and Chiang 2009) . The Obama administration's expansion of the number of NSF fellowships late in the first decade of the twenty-first century was associated with increased graduate enrollments and PhDs for the US born and permanent residents roughly consistent with predictions of its impact (Freeman 2006) . Given this evidence, and the potential benefit from increased efforts to translate scientific findings into production, it may be worthwhile to consider a new set of fellowships for master's or doctorate graduates specializing in the transformation of knowledge into US production. Such a program would produce scientists and engineering specialists in what the NIH calls "translational sciences."
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To focus business thinking on increased production of R&D-based goods and services in the United States, the government could consider requiring federal contractors or firms that benefit from R&D tax credits or receive direct government support for R&D to develop impact statements about the likely effects of technological advances and innovations and to make affirmative action plans for ways to produce those products in the United States rather than overseas. The federal government and many states require firms to make environmental impact statements if their actions are likely to significantly affect the quality of the human environment. 25 Governments also require government contractors and subcontractors to take affirmative action to prevent discrimination against employees or applicants for employment on the basis of "color, religion, sex, or national origin," where affirmative action may include outreach campaigns, targeted recruitment, and employee support programs. These programs have affected the way business thinks about its activities in both areas. If impact statements on the location of production from taxpayer-supported research had the same effect on corporate thinking as environmental impact and affirmative action statements, they could influence the location of production of innovative products and processes.
Combining fellowships to develop expertise in translation of research findings into product development and corporate impact statements with consideration of US production would give these initiatives better chances for success than if they were introduced by themselves.
C. International Students and Immigration
In a world where knowledge creation and the application of science and engineering-based knowledge is in the comparative advantage of the United States, placing hurdles on international students working in the United States as permanent citizens or residents may have an economic cost for the United States. Such hurdles lower the attractiveness of the United States as a destination for international students relative to countries such as Australia and Canada and others who seek to attract such students by offering them legs up in immigration. Given general agreement in the Congress and elsewhere that modernizing immigration policy to ease the path of international students to work in the United States is in the country's interest, I limit my comments to the nature of the debate. Policy discourse in this area often presents the situation as a win-win. This exaggerates the benefits of admitting more STEM or other highly educated immigrants to the United States and downplays the costs. The basic economics of immigration indicates that much of the benefits accrue to the immigrant (which is why they want to come) and that a greater supply of competitors adversely affects US workers in the same field as the immigrants (Borjas 2006) . There is no need for exaggeration, however, to make the case that in a world in which science and technology are critical in economic growth and comparative advantage, the United States would gain in those activities by keeping as many of the best and brightest from overseas who come to the country for education to continue their work in the United States if they so desire. As long as the United States maintains world leadership in university education and research, with researchers doing better work in the United States and US-educated researchers doing better work elsewhere in the world, it is likely that the aligning US immigration policies with its international policies is in the world's interest as well.
Science and technology policy can make the United States and world better today in ways that it never could have done before. and Poutvaara (2005) find similar magnitudes for being an international student on working in a foreign country for EU students. Since Erasmus funds short periods of study, its estimated impact is likely to be a lower bound on the effect of international study in the United States on migration decisions of international students.
Endnotes
20. For insightful discussions of citations and collaborations, see Barrantes et al (2012) , Lee et al (2010) , and Guerrero Bote, Olmeda-Gómez and de Moya-Anegón (2013) .
21. This is consistent with Kahn and MacGarvie's (2012) finding that the Foreign Fulbright Program requirement that Fulbright recipients return to their home countries before applying for a work visa in the United States reduced their scientific productivity compared to what it would have been had they remained in the United States.
22 23. The United States has a disproportionate share of top universities in every global ranking. See, for example, the ratings of world universities by the Center for World-Class Universities at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, which place 8 of the top 10 in the United States (http://www.shanghairanking.com/ARWU2013.html). The Times rankings have 7 of the top 10 in the United States (http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world -university-rankings/2013-14/world-ranking), but its reputation rankings have 8 of the top 10 in the United States (http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university -rankings/2014/reputation-ranking).
24. The sluggish translation of biomedical science findings into drug development or other medical practices sufficiently upset the NIH that in 2011 the agency established the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences to transform the translational science process so that new treatments and cures for disease can be delivered to patients faster.
25. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_impact_statement.
